We consider a two-tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit in uence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit in uence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy. We analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker. Political independence increases those agency costs but signiÿcantly stabilizes the politically induced uctuations of in ation and improves ex ante social welfare.
Introduction
Our current understanding of how the design of credible monetary institutions ensures greater economic stability has been signiÿcantly improved by the contracting approach pushed forward by Walsh (1995) , Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Svensson (1995) . This principal-agent literature argues that the in ationary bias due to the time inconsistency of monetary policy 1 can be avoided by delegating through contract the implementation of this policy to a central banker (thereafter CB) who is separated from the main government body.
2 This physical separation is often viewed as an ingredient of the CB's independence from the political sphere since it certainly insulates somewhat monetary policy from the day-to-day in uence of political authorities and from uctuations in the preferences of those political principals. However, the ip-side of this separation is that the CB may then be subject to various political pressures coming from organized interest groups willing to push their own views of what should be monetary policy. 3 In this paper, we combine those two elements to obtain a more complete view of the political mechanisms which in uence monetary policies. The CB is both subject to the explicit in uence of elected political principals and to the implicit in uence of interest groups which want to capture monetary policy. The choice of the CB legal status, i.e., whether he is independent or a liated to the elected political principals, a ects then the scope for capture of the monetary policy by private interests and di erent institutional choices lead to quite di erent policy outcomes. Under independence, the CB is less controlled by political principals and more responsive to interest groups. However, this status also isolates monetary policy from uctuations in the identity of the elected political principals. As a result of this trade-o , the independence of the CB appears as an institutional best response to the threat of capture under political uncertainty.
Our view of central banking as balancing political versus private interests in uences on monetary policy is inherited from Friedman (1962 Friedman ( , 1972 . According to him, central bank independence "embodies the very appealing idea that it is essential to prevent monetary policy from being a day-to-day plaything at the mercury of every whim of the current political authorities" but the ip-side of independence is that the CB becomes too much receptive to the "point of view of bankers", an organized interest group attempting to in uence monetary policy. Consequently, Friedman rejected CB independence arguing that if elected politicians cannot be trusted for the conduct of monetary policy, "money is too important to be left to central bankers". The extreme solution suggested by Friedman was an in exible monetary rule (a ÿxed growth rate of money) in order to "insulate monetary policy both from the arbitrary power of a small group of men not subject to control by the electorate and from the short-run pressures of partisan politics". This policy has of course a very high social cost both in terms of stabilization and in terms of non-responsiveness to changes in the preferences of society. In this paper, we take a less rigid view of what should be monetary policy and investigate how contracts and institutions for monetary policy can be designed to trade-o the desire to insulate monetary policies from political authorities and the need to make those institutions robust to capture by private interests.
To tackle these issues, we take a broad view of the control that a political principal exerts on the CB. These control rights involve not only the design of the CB's incentive scheme but also whether the CB can be removed or not after an election. When the CB is under political control, a newly elected political principal can choose a new CB a liated to him. 4 Instead, under political independence, the CB cannot be ÿred by the elected political principal. 5 Contrary to the existing contracting literature, the CB's incentive contracts are not designed by social planners but by partisan political principals who want to please di erent constituencies and express thus di erent concerns for the trade-o between price control and surprise in ation depending on whether they represent a leftist or a rightist constituency. Because of informational asymmetry between the CB and the government, there is also scope for a collusion between private interest groups and the CB. 6 However, the scope for capture depends on the exact control rights that principals retain on the CB. In this framework, we ask whether granting political independence to the CB improves social welfare, whether more political independence makes monetary policy more sensitive to the in uence of interest groups, and we ÿnally investigate how those incentive contracts depend on the legal status of the CB.
We show that the threat of capture on monetary policy increases the political uctuations in monetary policy induced by the game of regime switching between rightist and leftist parties. Indeed, at the margin, left-and right-wing parties react di erently to the threat of capture. The leftist party being more concerned by expansionary policies ÿnds at the margin easier to ÿght capture by an anti-in ationist interest group. However, granting political independence to the CB somewhat insulates monetary policy from these political uctuations: A stabilization e ect. The cost of independence is nevertheless that the CB is more prone to capture by interest groups: A delegation e ect. The stabilization e ect is always strong enough to dominate the delegation e ect. Hence, ex ante social welfare is greater under political independence than under political control. When capture of the monetary policy is a crucial concern, it is socially optimal to reduce the politically induced uctuations of in ation it induces. This is better achieved by granting political independence to the CB who better stabilizes those uctuations around a middle-road policy. Political independence is thus an optimal institutional response to the threat of capture in a world of political uncertainty. 4 This extreme assumption is in fact a modeling short-cut to capture settings where the elected principal can change a signiÿcative number of Board members after the elections as in most countries. 5 In practice, the status of the ECB sets the term of o ce for his President at 8 years reducing thereby the control of (often shorter lived) European governments on this CB.
6 See Tirole (1986) and La ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) for similar collusion models in the regulation literature.
7 Even though, we derive this result in a model where an anti-in ationist interest group exerts pressure on the government, it is independent on whether anti-or pro-in ationist pressures are exerted on the CB.
The design of monetary institutions in a framework of regime switching between partisan political principals has already been addressed in models Â a la Rogo (1985) where, instead of being corrected through an incentive scheme, the CB's preferences on the output-in ation trade-o can be chosen at the outset. The corresponding deÿ-nition of independence is then related to the timing of the CB's appointment. A CB is independent when he is cooperatively appointed by the partisan parties before the elections. Along these lines, Waller (1989) and Alesina and Gatti (1995) show how politically induced uctuations in output and growth can be stabilized under independence. In Alesina and Gatti (1995) for instance, political independence stabilizes in ation uctuations because the private sector expectations are formed before any political uncertainty is resolved. By analyzing the di erence in agency costs associated to the di erent legal status, we get a similar result without relying on the questionable assumption that private agents lock themselves into nominal contracts before the resolution of electoral uncertainty.
8 Waller (1992) studies how the timing of appointments and elections a ects the CB's degree of in ation aversion.
9 Paralleling this insight in a contracting framework, we relate also the timing of nominations to the exact control rights exerted by the political principals and we investigate also how this timing a ects agency costs, contract design and institutional choices.
10 Finally, our analysis borrows the methodology of Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2000) who provide a theory of political independence for regulatory agencies but we apply this framework to a more complex macroeconomic environment.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the case of political independence. It stresses how the variance of in ation can be used as a tool to constrain collusive behavior between an anti-in ationist interest group and a CB.
Section 4 shows how the nature of this collusion changes under political independence and how the legal status of the CB a ects the monetary policies chosen by partisan governments. We demonstrate there that political independence reduces the uctuations in the variance of in ation. Section 5 provides some welfare analysis and discusses the optimal institutional choice. Section 6 introduces pro-in ationist groups and shows the robustness of our results. Section 7 concludes and discusses possible extensions of our framework. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
The model
This model describes the relationship between an elected political principal, a CB and the private sector in a two-tier contracting model of monetary policy. The political principal can be thought of as the elected legislative or executive branch of the government.
11 He maximizes the well-being of his constituency. Because he is better informed on economic conditions, the e ective control of monetary target is left to a CB who has discretion in choosing the in ation target within those initially suggested by the political principal. The political principal has some control on his CB and can put some constraints on the agency decision-making process through the ex ante design of an incentive contract. 12 2.1. Preferences CB: The CB receives a monetary transfer s from whichever political principal gets elected. This transfer can be viewed as the budget of the CB, his private beneÿts and "prestige" drawn from holding o ce or as a reduced form for his "career concerns". The CB's utility writes as V = s:
Political principals: Contrary to the whole contracting approach to central banking, the CB's incentive contract is not set by a benevolent legislature. Partisan political principals want indeed to please particular constituencies which give them political support. Following the "partisan politics" literature, political principals have di erent preferences regarding the trade-o between in ation and unemployment. Depending on whether they defend a "leftist" or a "rightist" constituency, they are more or less inclined to prefer suprise in ation to price stabilization. A political principal maximizes an objective function Â a la Barro and Gordon (1983) :
where is the in ation level, e its expectations and i ¿ 0 (with i ∈ {L; R}) is the weight that the political principal puts on creating surprise in ation.
13;14 Â is a macroeconomic shock a ecting both political principals' concerns for output expansion.
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11 and Froyen et al. (1993) have shown that the executive branches has a stronger in uence than the legislative one on monetary policy conducted in the U.S.
12 This control can be explicit as in New Zealand nowadays but could also be more implicit. Beck (1987) , for instance, argues that presidential preferences for monetary policy are somewhat transmitted to the Fed even if the exact mechanism requires further study. See also Wooley (1984) for a similar view.
13 A quite similar objective function would also be obtained in a model where political principals have an objective function SW i = − 2 =2 − ( i =2)(y − y * ) 2 and output is given by the Philips curve y = − e + Â as it can be easily checked by simple computations.
14 Our results are robust to the exact speciÿcation of the marginal cost of the CB's wages in the principal's objective function. This means that they hold also if this objective function is written as SW i = − 2 =2 + i Â( − e ) − s; for any ¿ 0. Introducing this extra parameter would only help to parameterize the size of the agency problem between the political principal and the CB without consequences on the main insights of the analysis. This also shows that even an inÿnitesimal value of is enough to make the agency problem relevant for the optimal choice of institutions.
15 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) use the alternative formulation:
− s where the shock a ecting the political principals' willingness to expand output enters additively. With such a formulation, there would be no di erence between the monetary policies of a rightist and a leftist government under full commitment. Our multiplicative speciÿcation introduces such a di erence. This di erence turns out to be the crucial factor for the politically induced uctuations of monetary policy.
Finally, the CB's utility has no weight in the political principal's objective function since the latter is only concerned with the well-being of groups with signiÿcant electoral power.
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The random variable i may be either high ( = L with probability 1 − p) or low ( = R with probability p) depending on whether the elected government defends the leftist or the rightist constituency. A rightist government is less willing to create suprise in ation than a leftist one. We denote by = L − R ¿ 0 the degree of polarization of this society, i.e., the di erence between the concerns for surprise in ation between a leftist party and a rightist one. As in most models of partisan politics, the probabilities that each of these two political principals gets elected are exogenous.
For further references, we deÿne also a measure of aggregate social welfare as
This expression is simply an average of both principals' objective functions weighted by the probability that each of them gets elected.
Interest groups: We ÿrst focus on the case of political pressures for anti-in ationist policies. 17 A typical example of an anti-in ationist group is given by the ÿnancial sector. Indeed, as other authors have noticed, ÿnancial institutions earn their living by borrowing short and lending long. Similarly, securities dealers hold highly levered balance sheets. These groups are thus hurt by surprise in ation.
18 Posen (1995) has also pushed the view that the ÿnancial sector provides the political support for the independence of the CB. As we will see below, this statement is consistent with the fact that the ÿnancial sector may beneÿt from the independence of the CB to increase the scope for capture. On related lines, Blinder (1999) underlines the strong in uence of ÿnancial markets on monetary policy and the risk of such an in uence when he claims "My point is simply that delivering the policy that [ÿnancial] markets expect-or indeed demand-may lead to very poor policy".
As a matter of fact, collusion between the CB and the banking system is more likely in countries where the CB supervises the banking system because supervision creates a particular link between the CB and the banking sector. The CB might consider that its prime objective is to protect the anti-in ationist objectives of banks and not to realize the optimal monetary policy. This is certainly why some countries, like United Kingdom, have recently removed supervision from the scope of their CB's activities. 16 Alternatively, suppose that political principals' objective functions also involve the utility V of the bureaucrat but that there is a positive cost of public funds . Then this objective function writes as SW i = − 2 =2 + i Â( − e ) + V − (1 + )s and, again, an inÿnitesimal value of is enough to make the agency problem relevant for the optimal choice of institutions. 17 We discuss also in Section 6 how pro-in ationist interest groups could enter the picture. 18 Kane (1980) argues that builders and construction unions form also anti-in ationist interest groups for similar reasons.
The anti-in ationist interest group gets a utility from unexpected in ation which is equal to
where ÿ is a positive parameter.
Information
The shock Â is drawn from a common knowledge distribution on = {Â; Â} with respective probabilities and 1 − . It is convenient for what follows to use the normalization Â = 1 and we denote Â = 1 − Â ¿ 0. Anti-in ationist incentives are the thus greatest when Â realizes.
The CB and the interest group have complete information on the shock Â. Typically, the CB and the anti-in ationist ÿnancial sector have an earlier access to data relevant for determining money demand than the public.
19 Instead, at the time of designing the CB's incentives, political principals and the (non-ÿnancial) private sector remain uninformed on the exact value of this shock.
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Political principals have to rely on a revelation mechanism to obtain this information from the CB.
This information structure has already been stressed by some authors. In an empirical analysis, Peek et al. (1999) have discussed the complementarity between bank supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy. They showed that conÿdential bank supervisory information could help the Board sta to obtain more accurately forecast on important macroeconomic variables and is used by FOMC members to guide monetary policy. Indeed, problems in the banking sector may serve as an early indicator of deteriorating macroeconomics conditions. Moreover, this information could provide advance notice of changes in bank lending behavior which would a ect the credit channel of monetary policy.
Lastly, we assume that Â is a piece of information which cannot be fully manipulated. The CB can hide veriÿable evidences on the fact that the economy is doing badly (Â) and announces instead thatÂ=Â. The mere possibility that the CB can hide such pieces of information will be key to understand the scope for collusion with an anti-in ationist interest group. On the contrary, the CB can make credible reports that the economy goes well by showing hard econometric evidences.
Incentive contracts
The grand-contract between the elected political principal and the CB consists of wages s and in ation targets . In our framework, the Revelation Principle applies and there is no loss of generality in restricting the elected principals to o er direct revelation mechanisms {(s i ; i ); (s i ; i )} where i ∈ {R; L}. The CB chooses within this menu according to his report on the state of the economy. 21 (s i ; i ) (resp. (s i ; i )) represents, respectively, the wage and the in ation target when the economy goes well Â (resp. goes badly, Â). 
Capture
We model the congruence of interests between anti-in ationist interest groups and the CB as a collusion, or side-contract, along the lines of Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1992 and La ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) . By bribing the CB, the interest group in uences the latter's choice of in ation target within the menu proposed by the elected political principal.
Scope for capture: When a bad state of the economy realizes, the anti-in ationist interest groups would like that the CB reports Â to keep in ation low. By having the CB misreport to the political principal, the interest group beneÿts from a stake which is equal to ÿÂ
The interest group is not willing to bribe the CB for misreporting when Â realizes since doing so would increase in ation.
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Transaction costs of side-contracting: The interest group in uences the CB through monetary bribes. Making this assumption is an helpful modeling short-cut since these bribes may actually take the form of various in-kind or implicit favors. 24 However, because of the illegal nature of capture, the side-contract between this group and the CB su ers from some transaction costs. 25 Transferring units of wealth to the CB increases his private beneÿts from holding o ce only by K( ) where − K( ) represents the transaction costs of side-contracting. To characterize explicitly the institutional response to the threat of capture, we stipulate a particular functional form for K( ), namely:
where 0 ¡ k 6 1 and r ¿ 0. We consider constellations of parameters such that potential bribes will belong to the interval [0;
k r ] where K(·) is increasing. Note also that K(·) is strictly concave. These two assumptions capture the fact that transferring more wealth to the CB makes easier for the interest group to a ect his decision-making but that the marginal e ciency of doing so decreases. 26 Lastly, the CB has all the bargaining power at the side-contracting stage and appropriates most of the gains of his collusion with the interest group. The bribe given to the CB when he misreports the state of nature is thus worth the whole stake of capture, ÿ i .
The legal status of the central bank
The CB has political independence (hereafter superscript PI) when he cannot be removed from o ce by newly elected political principals. Political independence does not mean that the elected political principal loses all control on the CB since the CB still receives a contract from this elected principal. 27 Under independence, the elected political principal has lost only his control of the appointment procedure for members of the board of the central bank. Under political control (hereafter superscript PC), a new CB is appointed each time a new political principal gets elected. The principal has control rights on who should be the head of the central bank.
Timings of the game
The timing of the game depends on the legal status of the central bank only through the new collusion possibilities that independence opens.
We ÿrst envision the case where a new CB is appointed each time a new political principal gets elected. T = 0: The electoral outcome realizes and the preferences of the elected political principal i are known by all players including the private sector of the economy. T = 1: The CB receives a grand-contract from the political principal who has just been elected. This contract stipulates wages and in ation targets. The private sector forms its expectations on in ation and negotiates wage contracts. T = 2: Ex post collusion stage. If he has accepted the grand-contract, the CB o ers a side-contract to the interest group. This side-contract is accepted or refused. T = 3: Â is learned by the CB and the interest group. T = 4: The CB makes an announcementÂ on the state of the economy and the corresponding in ation target and wage are implemented. Side-transfers, if any, are exchanged.
An important assumption should be stressed at this point. The fact that the CB is a liated to a particular political principal and is only removed once a new political principal gets elected implies that the collusive side-contract can only be signed ex post, i.e., once the elected political principal has already appointed his CB.
Under political independence, political parties propose monetary policies to the CB before political uncertainty resolves. 28 One can view these proposals as the campaign platforms of the two candidates. 29 Collusion can now takes place also ex ante. T = 0: Both political parties propose non-cooperatively their electoral platforms. These platforms consist of incentive contracts to the CB. These grand-contracts stipulate budgets and in ation targets conditionally on the fact that the o ering party gets elected. The CB accepts or refuses both grand-contracts being still uninformed on the state of the economy Â. T = 1: Ex ante collusion stage. If he has accepted the grand-contracts, the CB o ers a side-contract to the interest group. This side-contract is now conditional on the electoral outcome. T = 2: The electoral outcome realizes and the preferences of the political principal i are known by all players including the private sector of the economy which now forms its expectations on in ation.
Stages T = 3 and 4 are then the same as with a liated CBs. Under political independence, the CB has thus the ability to commit to a side-contract with the anti-in ationist interest group before political uncertainty resolves. It is useful to already stress that this commitment ability is the source of the CB's own beneÿt from independence as we will see later.
Note that the sequence of events is such that the private sector knows precisely who gets elected before setting wage contracts. 30 Also, in both cases, side-contracting takes place before the realization of the state of nature.
A benchmark with complete information
For future references, we derive the optimal monetary policy when a political principal with preferences i (i ∈ {L; R}) has complete information on the realization of shocks, keeps full control on the monetary policy (i.e., does not rely on a CB) and has the ability to commit to this policy before the private sector forms its expectations and negotiate wage contracts. Under complete information, the ÿrst best in ation targets, 
Rewriting the principal's objective as a function of average in ation e i and the di erence in in ation targets i = i − i , the principal's problem becomes
Since the political principal has the ability to commit to this policy rule, the optimal monetary policy entails no in ationary bias:
The di erence in in ation targets between both states of the world is thus
Greater concerns of the political principals for surprise in ation (i.e., i larger) increase therefore the variance of in ation (1 − )( i ) 2 . In ation is positive (resp. negative)
when a bad (resp. good) shock hits the economy. For further references, we observe that the political induced uctuations in the variance of in ation depend only on the degree of polarization since
The commitment policy above has been extensively criticized for not being timeconsistent. In what follows, we investigate instead how this policy is robust to political pressures. Taking this perspective highlights that di erent institutional designs o er di erent responses to agency problems. It is not the lack of credibility that distorts the CB's incentives but the fact that the it may report excessively good news on the economy when it is captured by an anti-in ationist interest group who wants to avoid expansionary policies.
Monetary policy under political control
We now derive the second best in ation targets obtained when the political principal with preferences i is elected but relies on a privately informed, captured but a liated CB to implement his most preferred monetary policy.
Collusion-proofness constraint
To truthfully report, the CB must be su ciently rewarded so that colluding with the anti-in ationist interest group becomes a dominated strategy. The grand-contract must thus satisfy a collusion-proofness constraint:
The left-hand side of (3.1) represents the wage di erential necessary to prevent collusive behavior and to induce truthful announcement by the CB. The right-hand side of (3.1) represents the beneÿts that the CB can pocket from his collusive relationship with the anti-in ationist interest group. This beneÿt takes into account the transaction costs dissipated in side-contracting. Importantly, the collusion-proofness constraint derived above is a function of i only. It depends thus only on the variance of in ation and not on its expectation. Henceforth, the nature of this collusion-proofness constraint is actually consistent with any timing for the formation of the private sector's expectations. The private sector can sign wage contracts indi erently before or after side-contracting has occurred without a ecting the nature of the collusion-proofness constraint. Finally, we assume thereafter that the following condition holds Assumption 0. k=r ¿ ÿ i Â for i ∈ {R; L}, so that the ÿrst best in ation targets yields a stake of capture belonging to the set of bribes where K(·) is increasing.
Participation constraint
The CB prefers to enter the public sector rather than getting an exogenous reservation utility normalized at zero. The following participation constraint must be satisÿed:
Note that, when i = i − i ¿ 0, (3.1) and (3.2) imply also that s i ¿ 0. This latter participation constraint can be omitted in what follows as long as the stake for collusion remains positive. To insure this, we assume that Assumption 1. kÿ ¡ i Â for i ∈ {R; L}.
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Finally, to guarantee concavity of the principals' problem when collusion is a concern, we also impose that Assumption 2. rÿ 2 ¡ .
31 Tirole (1986) and La ont and Tirole (1991, Chapter 11) prove that there is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to o er collusion-proof mechanisms in similar models.
32 The principal will never ÿnd optimal to o er in ation targets such that i is negative at the optimal contract. Indeed, when Assumption 1 does not hold, it is easy to see that the optimal contract entails i = i =0 and that there is no stake for collusion.
Assumptions 0 and 2 are automatically satisÿed when r is small enough, i.e., when the transaction costs of side-contracting are small enough.
Optimal in ation targets
Under asymmetric information and the threat of capture, an optimal monetary policy proposed by principal i must implement collusion-proofness at a minimal agency cost: Both constraints are obviously binding, otherwise the principal could o er the same in ation targets and reduce at least one transfer to the CB, increasing thereby his constituency's well-being. Note that the CB is thus rewarded when he announces that the economy faces a bad shock and chooses an expansionary policy since s i ¿ 0. Instead, when a good shock hits, the CB gets no reward. Intuitively, to ÿght capture the CB must be rewarded to announce news which hurt the interest group.
With political control, the agency cost associated with the delegation of monetary policy to the CB writes thus as
The optimal collusion-proof monetary policy with an a liated CB solves
We index with a superscript PC meaning political control this optimal policy. Direct optimization yields immediately No in ationary bias: The threat of capture of the central bank does not a ect the ability of political principals to avoid any in ationary bias. Even if it is somewhat undermined by asymmetric information, delegating monetary policy to a CB before the private sector forms its expectations still helps the elected political principal to commit and to correct ex post incentives for surprise in ation. Of course, this contract is now a ected by the principal's desire to avoid the capture of monetary policy. Nevertheless, solving the collusion problem does not con ict with maintaining credibility.
Variance of in ation: Comparing (2.4) with (3.3), we observe that delegation of monetary policy to a better informed CB requires to reduce the variance of in ation. The outcome of the political process is such that the political principal looks more in ation averse than what he really is. Indeed, the policy outcome is exactly the same as if the political principal runs himself the monetary policy, gets perfect information on the macroeconomic shock but had his preference parameter i being replaced with
where the right-hand side inequality follows from Assumptions 0 and 2. Everything happens thus as if the preferences of the anti-in ationist interest groups were somewhat embodied into the preferences of the political principals. Anticipating the political pressures for stringent monetary policies, the principal behaves as being more in ation-averse. The fact that monetary policy looks like being implemented by a more in ation-averse government does not come from any bias for low in ation in the CB's preferences but from the fact that the monetary policy must satisfy a collusionproofness constraint which appears endogenously in a framework with asymmetric information. By reducing the variance of in ation below its ÿrst best value, the political principal reduces the stake of collusion with an anti-in ationist interest group. Information on economic shocks is thus obtained at a lower cost. The right-hand side of (3.1) is reduced and the socially costly wage given to the CB to satisfy this constraint diminishes. Of course, since a leftist party is more prone to run an expansionary policy, it o ers large collusive stake and su ers thereby more from the threat of capture by an anti-in ationist interest group.
Comparative statics: Interestingly, i (ÿ) decreases with ÿ. 34 The political principal commits to a more conservative policy when the anti-in ationist interest group has more pronounced preferences for surprise de ation. As a result, the optimal variance of in ation decreases also with ÿ. The threat of capture calls for less uctuations in in ation than the ÿrst best policy as the anti-in ationist interest group becomes more powerful. Indeed, those groups have then more in uence on the CB and the stake for capture increases. This makes collusion-proofness more costly for the political principal. Decreasing the variance of in ation prevents thus capture in a less costly way. We note also that
This latter equality shows that the possibility of capture increases the political induced uctuations in the variance of in ation. Finally, a greater value of r increases also the optimal choice of the variance of in ation made by the political principals. Indeed, when r increases, collusion becomes less e cient. Both political principals ÿnd it less valuable to reduce the variance of in ation to ÿght capture which is less of a concern. Their objectives become more dissonant and the politically induced uctuations in the variance of in ation also increase.
The social planner outcome: Had a social planner been ruling monetary policy with the help of a possibly captured CB, the variance of in ation would still be given by formula (3.3) but withˆ replacing i . The corresponding standard deviation in in ation target is exactly the average of those under partisanship since
(3.6)
Political uncertainty creates thus some politically induced uctuations in monetary policy around the middle-road policy which would be proposed by a social planner who would be controlling a possibly captured CB. We will see that those uctuations are in fact signiÿcantly reduced when political independence is granted to the CB.
In ation stabilization under political independence
The politically independent CB implements now the monetary policy for both elected principals. He now beneÿts from this political independence to o er a side-contract to the anti-in ationist interest group even before political uncertainty is resolved.
Ex ante collusion
Side-contracting takes now place ex ante and this is the expected stake of capture when Â realizes, namely ÿ(p R + (1 − p) L ), which matters to characterize the maximal bribe that the anti-in ationist group is ready to give up to the CB to make him lie on his announcement of the economic shock. To prevent this ex ante collusion, both political principals must collectively o er policy platforms giving an expected wage to the CB which is greater than what he may obtain from side-contracting. The corresponding ex ante collusion-proofness constraint writes thus as
(4.1)
Of course, the CB could also wait for the outcome of the election before o ering any side-contract at all and enter into ex post collusions which would look alike those considered in Section 3. However, the CB strictly prefers to commit to a side-contract before political uncertainty resolves. Indeed, because the e ciency of side-contracting K(·) is a strictly concave function of the collusive stake, we always have
We have already seen that (3.1) is binding at the optimal contract with ex post side-contracting. Hence, for a given pair of monetary policies ({ R ; R }; { L ; L }), the right-hand side above represents the expected wages to be given to the CB if side-contracts occur only ex post. Political independence, since it allows ex ante sidecontracting, makes thus collusion between the CB and the interest group harder to prevent.
Only the expectations of the wage di erentials s i − s i (i ∈ {R; L}) is determined when the ex ante collusion-proofness constraint (4.1) is binding as it will be the case in equilibrium. However, since the left-hand side of (4.2) is strictly greater than the right-hand side, it is possible to ÿnd values of s R −s R and s L −s L such that both ex post collusion-proofness constraints (3.1) are strictly satisÿed at the Nash equilibrium between both parties. Ex ante collusion-proofness implies thus ex post collusion-proofness. This means that, even if the collusive partners cannot commit not to collude ex post, i.e., once the political principal is elected, this collusion will not matter, since it will not be beneÿcial to the CB anyway.
Equilibrium in ation targets
Platforms on monetary policies are now o ered non-cooperatively by both parties before the elections. We are thus looking for a Nash equilibrium between the two possible political principals of a common bureaucracy. Taking as given the wages and the in ation targets promised by the leftist government, the optimal monetary policy o ered by the rightist government implements collusion-proofness at minimal cost when it solves
s.t. (4.1) and (3.2).
Both constraints are again binding and the agency cost borne by the rightist government under political independence writes thus as
The monetary policy o ered when the CB beneÿts from political independence solves
The following proposition characterizes the Nash equilibrium of this game. We index with a superscript PI meaning political independence of these policies. -If political principal i gets elected, the di erence in the in ation targets chosen by the CB is
-Moreover, the variance of in ation is reduced under political independence and we have
Stabilization of the variance of in ation: Comparing (3.3) with (4.3) and (4.4), we observe that the variance of in ation is signiÿcantly a ected by the legal status of the CB. Under political independence, a rightist (resp. leftist) government increases (resp. decreases) the variance of in ation and looks now much more alike a leftist (resp. rightist) government. Indeed, increasing R by increases the agency cost of delegation borne by the rightist government by an amount (1 − ) K (p R + (1 − p) L ). Since a leftist government is more willing to create surprise in ation than a rightist one, we have R ¡ L so that the right-hand side above is smaller than (1 − ) K ( R ) since K(·) is concave. This last term is in fact the marginal agency cost incurred by the elected rightist government when it increases by the variance of in ation, the CB is under its political control and collusion occurs thus only ex post. Therefore, the rightist government is more willing to implement an expansionary policy under political independence since the marginal agency cost of delegation decreases from its point of view. Similarly but for the reverse reasons, the leftist government's willingness to decrease the variance of in ation increases under political independence. As a result, the leftist government looks like a more in ation-averse government than what it really is. In both cases, everything happens as if the political principal had his preferences i being modiÿed to incorporate not only the pressure of interest groups as in Section 3 but also the political strength of the non-elected minority. For a rightist government, R (ÿ) is now replaced by R (ÿ) such that
That the preferences of the non-elected minority get now somewhat embodied into the actual policy outcome is directly implied by the fact that the ex ante collusion-proofness constraint makes the actual agency costs borne by the elected majority depend also on the policy which would have been implemented if the minority had instead been elected. When collusion matters, political independence ensures therefore the convergence of partisan monetary policies towards the socially optimal level of in ations implemented by a social planner. Keeping the same average variance of in ation than under political control (see (4.6)), the independent CB stabilizes the politically induced uctuations in the variance of in ation. Indeed, comparing the variances of in ation under both legal regimes yields
The extra politically induced uctuations in the variance of in ation introduced by the possibility of capture are now eliminated. With independence, we ÿnd back the ÿrst best political uctuations in monetary policy. Note that the parameter ÿ, i.e., the intensity of the anti-in ationist interest group's preferences for surprise de ation, does not a ect those politically induced uctuations under independence, contrary to the case of a liated CBs where those uctuations increases with ÿ. The stabilization in the politically induced uctuations of in ation becomes more signiÿcant as the preferences of interest groups are more pronounced.
According to our results, countries with independent CB should have less in ation volatility than countries with politically controlled central banks. This fact has received some empirical back up. In a cross-sectional countries empirical analysis, Cecchetti et al. (2001) compare the 1980s to the 1990s which witnessed the trend toward central banks independence. They observe that in ation volatility has fallen markedly while output variability has either fallen or risen only slightly. These authors show that this increased stability is essentially explained by more e cient monetary policies. Once one controls for the magnitudes of the shocks hitting each economy, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) also show that independent (in ation targeting) CBs achieve less in ation volatility for a given level of output volatility. Cukierman (1998, Chapter 22) deals with the well-known positive correlation between the mean and the variance of in ation. For a cross section of countries, his results suggest that at least a seventh of this correlation between the mean and the standard deviation of in ation is due to variations in the degree of CB independence.
Comparative statics: The rightist (resp. leftist) government has more incentives to increase (resp. decrease) the variance of in ation and thus to look more like a leftist (resp. rightist) government when the probability that he does not get elected increases. Even if it turns out that it does not get elected, the party which has the greatest probability of coming to power sees the monetary policy being signiÿcantly shifted towards the monetary policy it would have implemented had the CB been under its full control.
With a rightist (resp. leftist) government, the size of this upwards (resp. downwards) shift in the variance of in ation depends also on the degree of political polarization. Quite intuitively, more polarization calls also for adding greater corrective terms (resp. rÿ 2 (1 − p) Â =( − rÿ 2 ) for a rightist government and −rÿ 2 p Â =( − rÿ 2 ) for a leftist one) to the optimal standard deviation of in ation implemented under political control to get its value with political independence. More polarization implies indeed more politically induced uctuations of in ation both when the CB is under political control and when he is independent as it can be seen in (4.7). However, those uctuations in the variance of in ation are smaller in the case of political independence.
A greater value of r increases also the size of the corrective terms appearing under political independence. When r is greater, transaction costs of side-contracting are greater and political principals do not reduce so much the variance of in ation to prevent collusion. The politically induced uctuations of in ation remain quite large and the stabilization of monetary policies achieved under political independence is more valuable.
Ex ante welfare and constitutional design
Granting political independence to the CB clearly a ects ex ante welfare since it changes the in ation targets which are implemented. To better assess the welfare consequences of the CB's independence, we now isolate two e ects which are at work simultaneously. First, as shown by (4.2), the same in ation targets would be implemented at a higher expected agency cost under political independence than with political control. This delegation e ect is clearly a social cost of political independence. Political independence makes capture of the CB more costly for society. Second, assuming that agency costs would be the same with both legal status, i.e., assuming that, with political independence, the agency costs would still be computed with the ex post collusion-proofness constraints, social welfare would increase with political independence since in ation targets are now better stabilized around their socially optimal values and social welfare is a concave function. This captures the stabilization e ect of political independence.
To better assess the size of these two e ects and to determine which ends up dominating, we now rewrite social welfare in regime PC and when party i has been elected. Indeed, taking into account the expressions of the CB's wages obtained when (3.1) and (3.2) are both binding, expected social welfare when party i gets elected writes as a function of PC i only:
Under political control, the expected social welfare writes thus as
Under political independence, agency costs take a di erent expression than under political control. Taking into account this di erence, expected social welfare under independence writes instead as
The ÿrst parentheses above is greater than the right-hand side of (5.1) capturing the stabilization e ect. The second parentheses represents the di erence in agency costs between independence and political control when the agency cost under political control is computed with the in ation targets obtained under independence. This delegation e ect is obviously negative from the concavity of K(·). The capture of the CB is indeed more costly under political independence. Comparing both legal status of the CB, we deÿne
Proposition 3. From an ex ante social point of view, political independence is the best response to the threat of capture by anti-in ationist interest groups in a world of political uncertainty. Moreover, we have
On the one hand, political independence reduces the politically induced uctuations of in ation but do so by still preserving the mean ˆ of i . On the other hand, political independence increases the agency cost of delegation. Nevertheless, the ÿrst stabilization e ect always dominates and political independence should be granted to the CB.
With political independence, the non-elected minority is better protected since the monetary policy chosen by the independent CB is closer to what would be chosen by the minority itself. A politically independent CB acts thus as a safeguard against expropriation of the minority by the elected majority. The best institutional choice gives more freedom to the independent CB and this plays against biased political principals.
The di erence in ex ante social welfare between both legal status of the CB increases when the technology of side-contracting is rather bad (r getting larger). As a consequence, any administrative rule hardening the collusion between the CB and anti-in ationist interest groups (so that the latter is better insulated from the in uence of this group) makes also the political independence of the CB be more valuable.
There exists a complementarity between the legal status of the central bank and those administrative rules. An example of such rules is a restriction on the length of the CB's tenure. Another can be to separate banking supervision from monetary policy so that the transaction costs of collusion between the CB and the ÿnancial sector increases.
Similarly, more polarization ( being greater) and more political variance (p(1−p) being greater) mean also a greater di erence between the monetary policies implemented by rightist and leftist governments. This exacerbated discrepancy between the most preferred monetary policies of both parties increases both the stabilization and the delegation e ect. The beneÿts of granting political independence to the CB are greater as political uncertainty increases. As a consequence, this independence is more beneÿcial in countries with coalitional governments since the latters are more likely to change and are characterized by higher political uncertainty.
Once elected, both biased principals dislike CB's political independence since it forces them to move monetary policy towards that of the minority. The independent CB's ability to commit to ex ante collusion nevertheless signiÿcantly stabilizes policies and make these policies less sensitive to the exact identity of the political principal who ÿnally gets elected. This stabilization may be good from an ex ante social welfare point of view as we have just seen in Proposition 3. To some extent, it may even be desirable for ideological biased principals before the election takes place: If they lose, their rival will implement a policy less di erent from what they would have done themselves. Indeed, since expected welfare is greater with political independence, there exist simple ex ante transfers which make both political principals beneÿt from the gains of stabilization. Of course, the relative gain of each of these principals may depend on the bargaining power of each constituency at the ex ante stage when the constitution is designed. In particular, if the design of the central bank charter is made by one of the partisan principals himself, he may be able to grasp most of the beneÿts from this independence. 
Pro-in ationist interest groups
Pro-in ationist interest groups are diverse. They may be employers who have an incentive to favor surprise in ation to pay lower real wages, small businessmen, farmers and borrowers who also beneÿt from surprise in ation when loan contracts are expressed in nominal terms. Insiders may be particular for reelection concerns, subgroups of Congressmen may also invest in information gathering and lobby accordingly for more expansionary monetary policies than what the median uninformed political principal wants to implement. Taking the view that the central bank is 35 We should note the di erence between this discussion and Alesina and Gatti (1995) . In the latter paper, both political principals must agree on the design of the degree of in ation aversion for the CB in a model Â a la Rogo (1985) and they do so through ex ante bargaining re ecting their strengths at the constitutional stage. Here, the agreement between both parties occurs also ex ante but consists of lump-sum transfers only. Ex post, the control of the CB and the design of his incentive package is left to whoever gets elected. actually a committee, those interest groups can also be seen as particular members trying to in uence the head of the agency. 36 This view can be particularly relevant in the case of central banks having regional representation where some regions can prefer looser monetary policy. 37 In the context of European monetary policy, countries have di erent preferences about in ation and some countries may be tempted to in uence the ECB's monetary policy if they beneÿt from more expansionary policies. Of course, the status of the ECB explicitly forbids any representative of the European Council to be part of the ECB's Council (Art. 15.1) but does not forbid the informal presence of EEC O cials at Board Meetings.
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Such a pro-in ationist interest group can easily be included into the analysis. To do so, suppose that such a group has utility AI = Â( − e ) for some positive parameter . When a bad shock hits the economy, the pro-in ationist interest group opposes to the incentives of anti-in ationist interest group which want to make the central banker lie on the state of nature. The stake for doing so is i when the political principal i is elected. Without entering into the details of the bargaining procedure between the CB and the interest groups, it should be clear that the CB cannot receive more bribes than (ÿ − ) i . Intuitively, the CB must leave to the pro-in ation interest group the amount i to avoid that the latter behaves as a whistle-blower and report to the government the true state of nature Â. Consequently, the collusion-proofness constraint is relaxed and can be written as
Of course, the previous equation is valid as long as the anti-in ationist groups are more powerful than pro-in ationists ones, i.e., ÿ ¿ . The analysis we made previously goes through with ÿ = ÿ − replacing ÿ everywhere. The presence of a countervailing interest group reduces the political induced uctuations of capture and reduces therefore the beneÿts of granting independence to the CB. Independence is less likely to occur when anti-in ationist interest groups are more powerful. If pro-in ationist interest groups are more powerful than the anti-in ationist ones, the CB would have no incentive to report a good shock when Â realizes. Instead, when only the good state of the economy Â can be manipulated and reported to be worse than what it really is by the CB, collusion between the CB and the dominant pro-in ationist interest group matters. One needs to introduce a collusion-proofness constraint of the form
(6.2) 36 For instance, Faust (1996) argues that members of a CB's committee are heterogenous with respect to the distributive consequences of surprise in ation. Toma (1982) also recognizes the heterogeneity of interest groups in uencing the FED's decision-making and defends the view that the political process is dominated by forces pushing to increase money supply. 37 In the U.S., monetary policy is made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consisting of the governors of the Federal Reserve System, nominated by the President of the U.S. and ÿve Presidents of regional Reserve Banks on a rotating basis. 38 The mere fact that Art. 7 of the status of the ECB precludes ECB's board members from receiving explicit recommendations from national political institutions can be viewed as setting up constraints reducing capture by national interest groups.
Without doing the complete analysis, it should ÿrst be clear that preventing collusion requires now to give a reward to the CB in the good state of nature. The capture of the CB also implies that political principals choose a policy PC i which is again smaller than FB i to counter the pro-in ationist political pressures on the CB. The politically induced uctuations in monetary policy are still expressed as in (3.5) but with replacing now 1 − since the manipulation takes place in state Â. Finally, it is easy to check that the stabilization and delegation e ects are also unchanged. The welfare analysis made in Section 5 remains valid and justiÿes also independence of the CB.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that di erent legal status of a CB are in fact associated with di erent opportunities for capture of the monetary policy by interest groups. The degree of political independence a ects thus the agency costs paid to control the CB. An independent CB helps to stabilize the politically induced uctuations of in ation but the agency costs of delegating monetary policy to such a CB increases also when the latter is granted political independence. Nevertheless, ex ante social welfare increases with political independence. This comes from the fact that the politically induced uctuations due to agency costs are better stabilized by an independent CB.
Several extensions of our framework could be discussed. First, it would be particularly interesting to analyze in our contracting framework how granting long-term tenures to CBs improves ex ante social welfare but may be costly when general economic conditions (like the distribution of shocks a ecting the economy or the preferences of the agents) may change over time. 39 Second, in our analysis, we have taken the probabilities that both parties get elected as purely exogenous. This has allowed us to explain the optimal choice of institutions for monetary policy in a world of political uncertainty. However, these probabilities could be endogenized and could thus depend on the monetary policies proposed by both parties before the elections. As we have seen, those political platforms are themselves signiÿcantly a ected by the legal status of the CB. Such an extension of the model would also allow us to analyze the interesting feedback that institutions have on the electoral outcomes. The amount of political uncertainty and the institutional choice would thus be derived simultaneously. Finally, it should be stressed that our model could also be extended to the case where principals have no ability to commit to their incentive contracts. Our comparison between independence and political control would also be meaningful in this framework.
Proof of Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, the objective function remains concave with respect to R . of course, PI e = 0 at the optimum. Optimizing with respect to R yields immediately the linear relationship characterizing the best response of the rightist government:
Doing similarly for the leftist party, we would have
Solving this linear system yields the values of the Nash equilibrium variance of in ation targets.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have SW = SW PI − SW PC = A + B where A represents the stabilization e ect and B the agency e ect. After some computations, we easily ÿnd that A = pSW ( where Var(·) denotes the variance operator. After computations, we ÿnd for the stabilization e ect:
We have also for the delegation e ect:
Summing both e ects yields Proposition 3.
